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Abstract
Service-oriented architectures (SOAs) are a commonly
used paradigm for IT infrastructures in various fields. Due
to their flexibility and the easy accessibility of their under-
lying web services, SOAs are the architecture of choice for
more and more service providers. Semantic SOAs (SSOAs)
are going one step further and are enhancing the common
SOA with semantic components.
However, a major success criterion of any SOA is the
existence of a reliant security infrastructure. Therefore, this
paper identifies security requirements for an eGovernment
SSOA focusing on communication security, trust, privacy
and access control. Our work is based on the architecture
designed within the scope of the European research project
Access-eGov, which envisions the development of a SSOA-
based eGovernment platform.
1 Introduction
Service-oriented architectures (SOAs) are increasingly
gaining popularity in large-scale computer networks. More
and more IT-providers wrap their applications into web ser-
vices, thereby enabling them to be easily registered, discov-
ered and integrated. Over the last few years this trend did
not only occur in profit-oriented IT companies but also to a
large extent in the field of eGovernment. Tight budgets and
pressure to save costs are only two reasons why many pub-
lic agencies offer their services electronically. On the other
hand, citizens also benefit from this option, since they can
now access a requested service at any time and from almost
any place.
Besides the benefits a SOA offers, a major draw-back is
the lack of unique standardized vocabularies. As the source
of service providers is very diverse, they tend to use differ-
ent vocabularies when registering a web service. To over-
come this issue, ideas from Tim Berners-Lee’s vision of the
Semantic Web [3] can be employed. Enhanced with seman-
tic components a SOA can perform the semantic matching
of user queries and web services annotated with different
ontologies. For such a Semantic SOA (SSOA) this involves
the mapping of different ontologies.
Targeting eGovernment and the vision of SSOAs, the
goal of the European research project Access-eGov1 is to
build a trans-national eGovernment platform that facilitates
user-friendly registration of eGovernment services for ser-
vice providers (e.g. public authorities) and easy discovery
of web services for citizens. In order to extend the already
de-centralized nature of SOAs, the Access-eGov platform
is built on a flexible peer-to-peer network, which can easily
be enhanced with new nodes in the network.
As Access-eGov is based on a SSOA, the registration of
an Access-eGov service does not only involve the common
quality of service data; Access-eGov goes one step further
and attaches a semantic description to each service. This al-
lows citizens to semantically discover a requested service.
Another feature of Access-eGov is the semantic description
of workflows, i.e. a complex sequence of basic web services
that need to be executed by the citizen in a given order to
fulfil a certain goal. A rich user interface, the Personal As-
sistant client will hereby support the user.
Since the processing of eGovernment services generally
involves citizen data of sensitive and private nature, a solid
security architecture is not only an integral part of Access-
eGov, but a key requirement for any functional and usable
middleware platform. The goal of this paper is to pinpoint
the security requirements we imposed after a careful study
of the underlying architecture. We identify common re-
quirements for system security as well as those that are
especially inherent to the environment of service-oriented
architectures. They range from privacy and trust related
issues to communication security and access control fea-
tures which all need to be addressed when creating a se-
cure service-brokering architecture for the electronic go-
vernment. For these requirements we recommend a couple
1IST Programme, Contract. No. FP6-2004-27020, http://www.access-
egov.org
of candidate technologies that need to be taken into consid-
eration in order to meet the security needs best. Finally, we
outline the physical arrangement of the different security
features in the various system parts.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 introduces the Access-eGov architecture includ-
ing general requirements, the functional system view, the
data view and the system architecture. In Section 3 we in-
troduce the security requirements we derived from the de-
signed Access-eGov architecture. After presenting related
work in Section 4, Section 5 finally concludes the paper and
gives an outlook on future work.
2 Semantic Service-oriented Architecture
The security requirements we impose in Section 3 are
based on the SSOA built in the project Access-eGov (see
Section 1). In order to provide the reader with a basic
overview of the environment that the architecture will be
operating in, we first describe the required qualities and the
functional features of the designed Access-eGov architec-
ture. This introduction will be followed by a brief insight
into the system components and the technology used.
2.1 General Platform Requirements
During the early design phase in Access-eGov, several
user requirements for the platform functionality were col-
lected [5]. Since Access-eGov aims at becoming a useful
tool in daily work for public agencies and citizens, its devel-
opment is entirely driven by domain requirements. Based
on the analysis of a series of interviews, we extracted those
recommendations that were considered crucial to the design
of the overall Access-eGov system architecture [6].
From these interviews, we identified the following cate-
gories of functional requirements that Access-eGov’s plat-
form is supposed to meet:
• High Availability
In contrast to the monolithic architecture developed
within the research project Webocracy [8], in which a
classic client/server technology was used as the under-
lying architectural paradigm, Access-eGov is required
to be less failure-prone. The service-brokering mid-
dleware of this trans-national semantic e-Government
platform requires a large-scale networking architecture
that is available at all times. Since the platform will in-
terconnect numerous e-Government service providers
and thousands of citizens from several European coun-
tries, the architecture should be outage-resistant and
scalable in order to handle thousands of service re-
quests at a time. In addition, it should be ready to
allocate responsibilities and delegate requests dynami-
cally.
• De-centralized Management
A de-centralized administration of all system compo-
nents is logically resulting from the demand for high
availability. Since various public service providers
are located in different countries, the need for a scat-
tered administration of the overall brokering platform
is obvious. The platform has to guarantee stable
and reliable operation and we therefore propose a
de-centralized and meshed management of the over-
all Access-eGov system. This will empower service
providers from different domains to manage and main-
tain the infrastructure independently from one another
without the need for structured coordination beyond
the negotiation of common interfaces. Also, Access-
eGov is required to be integrated smoothly into the
already existing database-landscape. Ideally, the ex-
isting domain knowledge storages are only loosely
coupled with new components introduced by Access-
eGov.
• Semantic Description of Web Services
All services brokered and orchestrated via the Access-
eGov platform will have to be semantically enriched.
The semantic meta-information will enable the Per-
sonal Assistant clients as the citizen’s interface to eas-
ily look up service information in distributed directo-
ries registering public service information. For this
purpose, the Personal Assistant will actively search
in registries, where each semantically annotated e-
Government service is listed. The Personal Assis-
tant interface then looks for those service descriptions
matching a personal life or business event and bundles
them to high-quality e-Government services. In order
to implement such a scenario, the platform must pro-
vide ways to annotate web services as well as a domain
ontology that controls the vocabulary. The platform
will also provide rich functionality to semantically an-
notate already existing services that it will broker over
the network.
• Composition of Workflows
Almost all public services of high-quality and use for
the citizen will require more than one e-Government
service. Therefore, the platform should be supported
by an ontology that takes care of the correct composi-
tion and execution of workflows for each event. Fol-
lowing that information, the overall system can locate
all relevant web services and combine them in a given
order that makes sense to the citizen and to the public
agencies.
• Mapping between Semantics
More and more larger organisations are developing and
already using their own taxonomies and controlled vo-
cabularies to semantically enrich the services they of-
fer. Service providers from different countries will
most unlikely use the same terminology for the an-
notation of their services. In order to enable Access-
eGov to broker service information in a large-scale en-
vironment with a mutlitude of different organisations
all having their own semantics, the platform should
be capable of semantically mapping descriptions from
different domains. To overcome this semantic incom-
patibility, we shall use mediation that performs map-
ping operations between certain domain ontologies as
well.
• Openness of Standards
The system will have to be able to generically support
all legacy systems currently used in those public agen-
cies that are taking part as user partner in the project.
This challenge could be dealt best with by using wrap-
per engines on the premises and intelligent connection
nodes in order to resolve heterogeneity on the vari-
ous system levels. Therefore, XML-based interfaces
should be offered, allowing the standardized exchange
of processing data.
• Security
Since most of the public services (both traditional and
electronic) require the exchange of citizen-related sen-
sitive data, special care must be taken when designing
a service-oriented architecture for electronic govern-
ment purposes. Section 3 will deal in depth with all se-
curity related requirements that a system like Access-
eGov will need to fulfil.
The requirements as outlined above demand for new
ways in information brokering architectures. Therefore, al-
ready proven technologies have to be extended and brought
together in order to build a performant and reliable mid-
dleware architecture that lives up to the demands of the e-
Government environment in particular.
2.2 Functional System View
After having outlined the general requirements that a se-
mantic service-oriented architecture shall satisfy, we focus
on the functional system view. We hereby have to differ-
entiate between the requirements of service-end-users (the
information consumers) and those of service-providers that
are using Access-eGov to have their public services bro-
kered (the information providers).
2.2.1 Information Provider View
An information provider has to tackle three main tasks as
described in Figure 1, namely registering new services, an-
notating services and building generic workflows out of al-
ready defined and registered services:
• Annotating a Service
The public administration official chooses from a set
of available ontologies. He uses the therein contained
concepts and relationships to mark up the important as-
pects of the service or website he currently describes.
This will include information about who is eligible to
actually use that service, what form of identification is
required up to the point of the privacy policies that the
service itself can offer. Finally, the annotator has to
add some general descriptions, including contact de-
tails for persons that are responsible for the service’s
operations.
• Registering a Service
After successful annotation of the service, all gener-
ated data is stored persistently; the service can now
be retrieved from all participating system components
connected to the network.
• Creating a Workflow
A far more challenging task for the public administra-
tion official is to build generic workflows based on al-
ready annotated services or already existing real-world
workflows. First, the annotator has to either find suit-
able services or already existing, suitable workflows.
This is done through either searching or browsing the
service and workflow repositories.
After having found suitable services or workflows, the
annotator has to concatenate them in a meaningful combi-
nation that is imposed by internal procedural guidelines or
legal conventions.
2.2.2 Information Consumer View
By nature, the information consumer (i.e. the citizen or
a business user) has a significantly different view on a
service-oriented platform as can be seen in Figure 2. A cit-
izen has two major possibilities of interaction with the plat-
form; he can specify his goal and can command the platform
to execute the retrieved services.
• Specifying a Goal
The citizen has to articulate wishes to the system and
has to tell the actual task that he wants to accomplish.
Therefore the Personal Assistant presents a list of life
events or services for browsing and the possibility to
search for life events. Once the citizen has chosen
one of the offered life events, the Personal Assistant
will translate the selection into a goal. It has to be no-
ticed that the life event could either be connected to an
atomic service, or to a predefined, generic workflow
composed of several atomic services.
Figure 1. An Information Provider View on a SSOA
• Executing a Scenario
When the user wants to achieve his goal, he lets the
Personal Assistant start the execution of the retrieved
service or workflow. The current progress of this run
is always visible to the user through the Personal As-
sistant client.
• Executing a Traditional Offline Activity
In many cases, the execution phase of such services
or scenarios will also include activities that are only
available offline. Access-eGov will, in this case, sim-
ply wait until notified of the completion of a specific
offline activity.
2.3 Data View
Within a service-oriented platform like Access-eGov,
”ontologies” are necessary to categorize real-world con-
cepts (e.g. objects, procedures) and to express them in a
semantic way that is defined and agreed upon by communi-
ties of users (e.g. collaborating organisations). In technical
terms, an ontology constitutes an explicit formal specifica-
tion of a shared conceptualization. This definition entails a
number of essential components which are common for all
sorts of ontologies. Ontologies define an agreed common
terminology by providing concepts and declaring relation-
ships between these concepts. In order to capture semantic
properties of relations and concepts, the ontologies need to
provide sets of logical expressions in a structured machine-
readable language. We use three basic ontologies in several
parts of the Access-eGov system. They are:
• Life Events Ontologies
Life events denote specific situations (in the life of a
citizen or a life cycle of an organization) that require
a set of public services to be performed. It contains
information about particular ”Goals”, which can be
grouped into several ”Generic scenarios”. This ontol-
ogy is capable of describing complex real-world sce-
narios like ”marriage”.
• Service Profiles Ontologies
A service profile specifies what the service logically
provides from a user’s perspective and is used by the
public administration to advertise services. This on-
tology will have to be powerful enough to describe all
non-functional and functional properties that a public
service can have. This ontology corresponds to the
real-world descriptions of a service’s capability (e.g.
a service resulting in issuing a passport).
• Access-eGov Domain Ontologies
Domain ontologies are considered lower level ontolo-
gies within the overall system. They are used to de-
scribe all the relevant domain information related to
a user’s scenarios. That means they will describe the
physical functional and non-functional properties of a
particular service, like required data types, and the like.
2.4 System Architecture
As already mentioned before, the architecture of our se-
mantic service-oriented platform, as depicted in Figure 3,
will be divided into three major component groups:
• Infrastructure
The core part of the system is the so called Access-
eGov Infrastructure, the service-oriented middleware
which itself is subdivided into different component
categories. All services that Access-eGov is supposed
Figure 2. An Information Consumer View on a SSOA
to broker will need to be shared and found by all par-
ticipants of the network. Thus, public administrations
have to annotate the services they want to share and
have them published in publicly accessible repositories
that are distributed across the network mesh. These
repositories are supposed to persistently store goals
(users’ aims), semantic service descriptions (the de-
scription of the actual service, for example its capa-
bilities), scenarios (structured service concatenations)
and ontologies. These distributed database federations
are interconnected and have to be mutually updated on
a regular basis in order to offer a system-wide view
of all the services that the different organizations and
public agencies offer via Access-eGov.
On top of these persistent data storage facilities,
generic executable platform services will be required
to maintain the middleware components and to manage
the dataflows. These so called Core Components trans-
parently enable the service users to execute operations
on the basic data repositories. It is here, where the
actual Semantic Web service ontology API, i.e. the ob-
ject model for Semantic Web service ontologies, will
need to be located. Another crucial module, the Con-
nection Manager will need to be utilized as the cen-
tral hub for communication within the whole system
in order to make the infrastructure components avail-
able to other system components as well as to the out-
side world. The Security Components are an integral
part of the whole architecture and will therefore also be
incorporated into the main infrastructure. The actual
requirements regarding this component will be found
out in Section 3. The most important operation func-
tionality of the whole system, the discovery and exe-
cution of web services, is carried out by the respective
Discovery, Composition and Execution modules which
are using a mediation module to map the different do-
main ontologies to comparable semantic descriptions.
• Personal Assistant Client
Access-eGov will also offer a generic user interface to
the citizens, the Personal Assistant client. The client,
and its counterpart the Personal Assistant platform
component in the middleware, perform another very
important aspect of the Access-eGov semantic service-
brokering system: to guide the user through public ser-
vic workflows and to help him in finding the services
that satisfy his needs best. Apart from the platform’s
own client interface, there will also need to be a fully-
featured, generic XML-API available to other front-
end implementations.
• Administration and Management Tools
During the first introduction phase, only a small
amount of services will be available that have explic-
itly been designed for Access-eGov and are available
in a form that the middleware platform is able to di-
rectly digest. All the other services, no matter if they
are ”traditional services” like signing a document in an
administration office or ”legacy services”, which could
for example be a web service or a web page, need to
be semantically annotated. Public agencies are sup-
posed to annotate those services that they are willing
to expose to the public. These kinds of service-related
meta-data will be transferred to the data repositories
via the ”Access-eGov Annotation Service”. Public ad-
ministration domain experts may use this generic an-
notation service component to create said semantic an-
notations for all kinds of services. Thus, it will be the
most important administration tool for our semantic
Figure 3. The Access-eGov System architecture
service-oriented architecture.
The offered services are still under control of the public
authorities offering them. It is at the authorities’ discre-
tion to become part of the Access-eGov single-sign-on do-
main or implement their own access control and user man-
agement. The actual service execution will be carried out
on the premises of the participating public agencies or in
their respective data centers. The services are only exter-
nally made available through Access-eGov and thus do not
form an integral part of the overall service-brokering sys-
tem. They are either electronically accessible (directly via
web service interfaces or web forms) or represent ”tradi-
tional” office services that may merely be described and
registered to the middleware. Only executable services will
dispose of an electronic XML-interface to the Access-eGov
Infrastructure.
3 Security Requirements
After depicting the general system requirements and the
components of Access-eGov, the following section will
therefrom derive several security requirements that such a
system will have to satisfy. Already during the early design
phase of Access-eGov, security-related requirements were
collected from the user partners regarding robustness and
security of the overall system [1]. Some of these recom-
mendations already influenced the overall conception of the
system components. During the first months of the project,
more security requirements arose that are unique to the field
of service-oriented architectures. This section refers to the
ongoing research that has been invested and features an
overview of the requirements as well as an outlook on how
security recommendations are considered to be realized in-
side the several system components.
• Communication Security
Regarding physical security on the network, user part-
ners expect messages to be sent over secure chan-
nels and only to those citizens who are authorized to
make use of a certain service. Thus, physical secu-
rity features in Access-eGov are required to encom-
pass encryption functionality and the ability to is-
sue and digest digital signatures. Since the Access-
eGov platform shall be operating as a service-oriented
architecture network, XML-messages should be en-
crypted in accordance with international standards is-
sued by W3C and OASIS. Access-eGov could there-
fore make use of a selected subset of WS-Security
mechanisms on application level. The Web Services
Security (WSS) specification from OASIS is a candi-
date technology defining how to apply XML signature
and XML encryption concepts in SOAP messaging.
This will satisfy three main security demands: Mes-
sage Integrity, User Authentication and Confidential-
ity.
On the appplication level, the signatures and the in-
tegrity of the encrypted messages should also need
to be controlled. Before forwarding a service re-
quest to the respective public service provider’s server,
XML-firewalls should be set in place to check each
single XML-encoded message for its encryption and
signature part. This will also disburden the service
provider’s application server and reduce network traf-
fic in the back-office sector. In addition, traffic be-
tween participating parties in Access-eGov should be
encrypted via SSL technology on network level.
• Trust
A requirement that arises from the nature of a wide-
spread network with a multitude of nodes is the need
to mutually trust the communication partner when
requesting a certain service or inquiring a certain
database entry. The nature of a peer-to-peer system
also mandates that new system nodes can be added
without reconfiguration of the whole network thus also
relying on a working concept of trust between nodes.
This also applies to the communication channels be-
tween the various Personal Assistant clients and the
platform itself. Mutual trust may be reached with the
network components authenticating themselves when
establishing communication relations to the user inter-
face clients; different components of the system or se-
curity architecture, which may very well run on the
same node, may also have the need to establish trust
between them.
• Privacy
In order to gain citizens’ trust in the architecture, the
Access-eGov platform needs to provide reliant privacy
mechanisms that protect user’s data both on client side
and in the infrastructure of the service provider. Cit-
izens must be able to tune individual privacy settings
with their Personal Assistant. Possible candidates for
a language to define privacy preferences are ”A P3P
Preference Exchange Language” (APPEL 1.0) [4], the
”Enterprise Privacy Authorization Language” (EPAL
1.2) [2] and the ”eXtensible Access Control Markup
Language” (XACML 2.0) [7].
In addition to default privacy settings, fine-tuning
of privacy preferences should be possible on a per-
process basis. Privacy preferences should always
be taken into account when discovering and execut-
ing web services. Ideally, mechanisms on the ser-
vice provider’s premises should be in place to enforce
users’ privacy settings.
• Access Control
Considering all requirements to the architecture, we
believe that employing an attribute-based access con-
trol model is the best choice for the Access-eGov ar-
chitecture. Following an access control infrastructure
as defined in XACML [7], we consider Access-eGov
to provide separated components for policy adminis-
tration, policy information, policy decision and pol-
icy enforcement. Such a flexible and dynamic ac-
cess control infrastructure suits well into a loosely
coupled service-oriented architecture like the Access-
eGov platform.
Furthermore, we require each service provider to an-
notate a service with security attributes in addition to
the functional semantic description. This way, Access-
eGov can efficiently impose platform-wide access con-
trol mechanisms that can be executed automatically
by the above mentioned XACML policy components.
Upon receiving a request for a service, the distributed
access control components take into consideration the
service’s security level as required by the public ad-
ministration and the validity of the credentials pro-
vided by the Personal Assistant client. Only then, a
user’s Personal Assistant should be granted access to a
service and forward the request messages to the public
agency in question.
The actual security mechanisms in Access-eGov are split
between the different system components, notably between
the Personal Assistant and the middleware platform. The
Access-eGov Personal Assistant will handle authentication
credentials provided by the user and forward them to the re-
spective public service agency. After choosing a goal and
before access is granted , the Personal Assistant lets the plat-
form check the user credentials.
• Platform Security
Most of the security mechanisms within Access-eGov
will need to be implemented as part of the service-
oriented architecture middleware, respectively inside
its distributed components. The dedicated access con-
trol components will need to act as access gateways
for the Personal Assistant clients and as guardians for
granting service access. The platform will also host the
security descriptions for all services. These databases
shall be used as persistent repositories when annotat-
ing services with generic information about the re-
quired user credentials.
• Back-Office Security
Legacy systems on the premises of the public agencies
will most favor the installation of XML-firewalls and
traffic-controlling proxy servers. This way, the current
data centers will be enabled to securely connect to the
semantic service-brokering system of Access-eGov.
• Personal Assistent Security
The Personal Assistant will mainly be occupied by ad-
ministering the personal security settings that each cit-
izen can fine-tune. This will give the citizen full con-
trol over his personal information set (including credit
card information, etc.). The main task of this compo-
nent will be to ensure end-to-end communication en-
cryption and to stay in compliance with current privacy
regulations.
4 Related Work
One research direction regarding security aspects of Se-
mantic Service Oriented Architectures (SSOAs) is to use
the semantic information present in the SWSs’ descriptions
for access control decisions [9] [11]. In [10] the concept of
a semantic firewall is introduced, which acts as an access
control component in SSOAs.
Many research projects are also starting to build net-
works based on SSOAs, like the contributors to the ESSI
cluster 2. None of the 6 projects in this cluster even hints at
planned security architectures in the projects’ summaries.
The TAO project 3 as another example does not explicitly
state security requirements as well. Especially in the field
of eGovernment, many projects like e.g. OntoGov 4 do not
have built-in security mechanisms on their research agenda.
On the other hand, many projects taking security into
consideration, like Terregov 5, are lacking of the seman-
tic perspective to service-oriented architectures. Treating a
high level of security and semantic service-orientation as
equal targets will therefore be a challenging task for our fu-
ture work.
5 Conclusions
With the emergence of service-oriented architectures the
need for suitable security infrastructures arises. Especially
in large-scale environments like many eGovernment appli-
cations such a security infrastructure is a decisive success
factor.
In this paper we introduced requirements for a secu-
rity infrastructure in a semantic service-oriented architec-
ture carried out in the European research project Access-
eGov. After we described all architectural layers we intro-
duced requirements of a corresponding security infrastruc-
ture, concentrating on communication security, trust, pri-
vacy and access control. We also laid out necessary security
mechanisms that should be in place.
Our underlying semantic service-oriented architecture
bears several opportunities for a complete security infras-
tructure. The existence of a user-friendly Personal Assistant
enables the easy input and fine-tuning of individual privacy
preferences. Furthermore, the existence of semantic infor-
mation in the platform can be used for powerful and flexi-
ble access control mechanisms. Finally, the loosely coupled
2http://essi-cluster.org
3http://www.tao-project.eu/
4http://www.ontogov.com
5http://www.terregov.eupm.net
character of the architecture even facilitates the distributed
storage of security components.
FutureWork will involve the design and the development
of the described security components in accordance with the
Access-eGov infrastructure. This will involve the thorough
testing of the infrastructure in pilot scenarios of three dif-
ferent countries.
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